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NOTES
The Irrevocable Proxy and Voting Control of Small
Business Corporations
Voting control of business corporations is prized because, through
selection of a majority of directors, it is the power to determine the use
of group assets. Since directors are chosen by vote at annual shareholder
meetings, those who have the legal right to vote a majority of enfranchised
shares retain the potential power of control. In the case of large cor-
porations with widely scattered ownership, factual control, by the avail-
ability of the proxy machinery, may reside in a group owning only a
small percentage of outstanding voting shares. In more closely held cor-
porations, attempts are made to achieve the same result by divorcing the
legal right to vote a majority of shares from ownership through the use
of legal devices such as non-voting shares, voting trusts, voting and pool-
ing contracts, and irrevocable proxies. This Note is concerned with the
problem of voting control of the closely held, usually small, corporation.
Since voting trusts, whereby owners transfer rights to trustees, are now
largely legislative creatures, the discussion will be confined to an exami-
nation of the irrevocable proxy, and the voting or pooling contract, two
relationships whose judicial enforceability is still subject to doubt. Ju-
dicial confusion over the validity of these voting agreements is more readily
understood in the light of the general theory of the business corpora-
tion evolving in a democratic society, and against the background of
traditional agency doctrine.
THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE DEMOCRACY
In the early law of business corporations, each shareholder was ac-
corded the same number of votes, regardless of his proportionate share
ownership. This was a vestige of the voting rules of the public or munic-
ipal corporation, whose charter was a gift of the Crown. The right to
vote was a personal trust given the member, and the same political
philosophy which assumed that every man had an equal interest in good
government, and that the highest governmental wisdom would result
from a clash of such individuals, was thought to be applicable to busi-
ness corporations.' Related to this belief was the doctrine that each share-
holder had contracted for the independent advice and judgment of his
fellow members at elections. 2 In the absence of statutory or by-law au-
thority, therefore, proxy voting was not permitted.3
With the appearance of general incorporation statutes permitting in-
corporation almost at will, and without the need for a special legislative
act, this philosophy became inapplicable. When voting rights commen-
surate with proportionate ownership were granted, the individual mem-
ber was displaced by the dollar investment as the voting unit of the group.
1. Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MicH. L. REv. 35 (1942) ; Bergerman, Voting
Trusts and Non-Votinq Stock, 37 YALE LJ. 445, 447 (1928).
2. Rohrlich, Corporate Voting: Majority Control, 7 ST. JOHNx's L. REv. 218, 225
(1933)) ; Note, 3 U. OF CI. L. REv. 640, 642 (1936).
3. Commonwealth ex rel. Verree v. Bringhurst, 103 Pa. 134 (1883) ; see Philips
v. Wickham, 1 Paige 590, 597 (N.Y. 1829).
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Shareholders did not have to be present at meetings in order to exercise
their judgment upon the deliberations of their associates, and, if absent,
could vote by proxy. Finally, free transferability of shares made a fiction
of the shareholder's contract for the judgment of his associates, since, un-
like a business partner, he had no control over the personnel of the mem-
bership.
Theory of Over-all Corporate Welfare.-These steps in the modem
evolution of the business corporation occurred in the process of securing
to private owners the legislatively implemented benefits of their property.
The very structure of the business corporation--one dollar, one vote, to
create representative management-initially gave owners the function of
dispensing the corporate patronage and distributing the corporate earnings
as their interests dictated. Implicit was the fundamental assumption that
the corporation's business policies would be guided so as to maximize
profits: the self-interest of ownership was to provide impetus and leader-
ship. This same self-interest of the majority of owners, which would be
directed toward making the corporate affairs prosper, would work to the
advantage of the minority. 4 If that whip were not sufficient, the courts
were prepared to prevent a majority from profiting at the expense of the
corporation, i. e., at the expense of the minority.
The theory of over-all corporate welfare was most directly expressed
as a policy against the separation of voting rights from share ownership.
By depriving himself of the right to vote, and by concentrating voting
power in another, it was thought that the sh4reholder exposed minority
owners to dangers of improper management motivation.5 The general
corporate welfare was also thought to be imperilled by the sale of votes.
This policy retains full vigor today. Besides the sanction of ordinary lia-
bility for management profit at corporate expense, a prophylactic rule pro-
hibiting use of a purchased vote has been accepted. 6 Certainly the temp-
tation to the vote-buyer to recoup his expense from the corporate treasury
is too great to risk. Similarly, a vote may not be purchased by the promise
of a salaried job with the corporation, since each director has a duty to
remain free, after election, to exercise independent judgment for the wel-
fare of the corporation. 7
With the acceptance of non-voting shares and voting trusts, how-
ever, together with the frequently attempted use of irrevocable proxies
and voting contracts, the argument has been made that the traditional
policy against separation of ownership from voting rights is moribund.,
The widespread use of ordinary proxies has also been thought by some to
point toward the same inference. 9 In order to assess the current situation
informedly, an examination of the development of agency doctrine and its
application to corporate voting is indispensable.
4. See Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 632, 61 S.E. 487, 490 (1908) ; Luthy v. Ream,
270 Ill. 170. 179, 110 N.E. 373. 376 (1915); Cone v. Russell & Mason, 48 N.J. Eq.
208, 212, 21 Atl. 847, 849 (Ch. 1891).
5. For a lucid analysis of this theory, see Cone v. Russell & Mason, 48 N.J. Eq.
208, 212, 21 Atl. 847, 849 (Ch. 1891).
6. Macht v. Merchants' Mortgage Co., 22 Del. Ch. 74, 194 Atl. 19 (Ch. 1937);
Laughlin v. Johnson, 230 Ill. App. 25 (1923) ; Palmbaum v. Magulsky, 217 Mass. 306,
104 N.E. 746 (1914).
7. Williams v. Fredericks, 187 La. 987, 175 So. 642 (1937) ; McQuade v. Stone-
ham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934). Where the thing of value given for the vote
is a salaried job, the contract violates both principles.
8. See notes 62-65 infra and text.
9. ROHRLICH, LAW AND PRACTISE IN CORPORArE CONTROL 44 (1933). The argu-
ment ignores the fact that owners retain the right to change their minds.
AGENCY POWERS AND PowERs "CouPLED WITH AN INTEREST"
The Ordinary Proxy.-The fiduciary obligation of an agent to act
for the interests of his principal and in accordance with his instructions
applies in haec verba to the ordinary proxy. It is merely an authority to
vote the absent owner's shares, given presumably out of the self-interest
of ownership. The shareholder may revoke the proxy by attending the
election and voting in person; xo he may revoke it by executing a subse-
quent proxy;" he retains all the powers of the ordinary principal, except
as agency rules need to be modified by the practical necessities of cor-
porate balloting. Furthermore, the fiduciary obligation of an agent to
act for the interests of his principal renders invalid a vote cast contrary
to his interest or instructions.12 Even when a majority of owners give
uninstructed or discretionary proxies, they retain at all times the power
to vote themselves for their self-interest.'8 To say, therefore, that judicial
and legislative recognition of proxy voting evidences an abandonment of
the policy against allowing the separation of ownership from voting rights,
is to be seriously superficial.
Powers "Coupled With an Interest."-Agency doctrine provides that
ordinary powers of attorney including the proxy power, are revocable by
act of the principal and terminable by his death.' 4 In an agency relation-
ship, even when a contract of employment exists by which the agent is to
reimburse himself out of the proceeds of his exercise of authority, the
principal retains the power to revoke the authority. By doing so, however,
he incurs a liability to the agent for breach of the contract of employment.
Nor can the parties change the legal relationship by agreeing that the
authority of the agent is to be irrevocable.' 5 The agent is doing business
for another, and needs the principal's consent before he may act validly.
The law does not permit him to continue against his principal's will merely
because he wants to earn compensation, and has a contract to perform
services. He is relegated to an action at law for damages. To allow him
to continue would be analogous to granting him specific performance where
his remedy at law is adequate.
The situation is strikingly different when the agent makes advances
to the principal, or incurs personal obligations for his benefit and at his
request, in reliance upon the power of attorney as security for repayment.
Here the "agent" has been held entitled to a property right in the power,
so that it is not revocable by the principal so long as the security need
exists. Such a power is termed "proprietary," since it exists independ-
ently of the principal's consent.'6 It is no longer a mere power of at-
10. Blanche v. Central Leather Co., 78 N.J. Eq. 484, 81 Atl. 571 (Ch. 1911) ; In
re Schwartz & Gray, 77 N.J.L. 415, 72 Atl. 70 (1909) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Lang-
don v. Patterson, 158 Pa. 476, 27 Atl. 98 (1893).
11. Pope v. Whitridge, 110 Md. 468, 73 At1. 281 (1909).
12. McClean v. Bradley, 299 Fed. 379 (6th Cir. 1924); Lowman v. Harvey
Pierce Co., 276 Pa. 382, 120 Atl. 404 (1923).
13. A general proxy merely signifies that the agent shall use his own judgment
in exercising the privilege.
14. See, generally, 5 FLTr;cia, CYCLOPIDIA OF CoaIoRATIoNs § 2062 (perm. ed.
1933); 1 MEcx ni, AGENCY §§ 561 ff., 651 ff. (2d ed. 1914); STEFFEN, CASES ON
AGENCY 40 (1933) ; Lowndes, Powers Coupled With an Interest, 12 HMv. L. REv.
262 (1898) ; Seavey, Termination b.v Death of ProPrietar.y Powers of Attorney, 31
YALE L.J. 283 (1922) ; Note, 64 A.L.R. 380 (1929).
15. 1 MECEm, AGENCY § 566 (2d ed. 1914).
16. For the distinction between agency and proprietary powers, see id. at § 561.
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torney. The "agent" now has a legally protected interest, not merely a
right to compensation for services rendered which he may exact from the
proceeds, but a right to execute the power conferred.
17
In the celebrated case of Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adn'rs,'5 Chief Jus-
tice Marshall introduced the term, "coupled with an interest," into the
American law of powers. There he ruled that a power to sell ships, given
to a creditor in lieu of mortgage, and with its exercise conditioned upon
default of the debtor, was terminated by the death of the debtor (the
power-giver), although it was conceded to be irrevocable during his life.
Marshall made this distinction apparently because he was dismayed at the
idea of executing a conveyance of property in the name of a dead man. 9
He expressed his decision by saying that the power was not "coupled
with an interest" in the ships, by which he meant, apparently, a legal
estate in the ships. The decision has retained validity only with regard
to powers over real property; the distinction between termination and
revocation is said to have been supported by not even a scintilla of au-
thority.20 But the expression, "coupled with an interest," acquired a life
of its own. It has since run through cases on revocation as well as termi-
nation,21 personalty and choses in action as well as realty,22 and has caused
serious confusion as to its real meaning.2 3 Nowhere else is the power of
the pat formula to mask thought better displayed. When the courts came
up against the irrevocable proxy and the voting contract, some seized upon
the phrase to supply authority for a new departure from sound corpora-
tion law.
IRREVOCABLE PROXIES
The irrevocable proxy is an enforceable power given by an owner to
exercise his voting rights independently of his future consent. He may
accomplish the same result through a voting or pooling contract, or by
means of a voting trust. In each instance, some courts have held that
the agreements may not be upheld unless the power-holder has a requisite
"interest." 24 Sometimes statutes governing the duration of a proxy use
17. Compare American Loan & Trust Co. v. Billings, 58 Minn. 187, 59 N.W. 998
(1894) (power given to B to sell property and vay proceeds to C in payment of a
debt owed C held not revocable by A when executed and accepted as security for such
debt) with Coburn v. Davis, 201 Iowa 1253, 207 N.W. 586 (1926) (power revocable,
the agent's advance not having been given in reliance on the power) ; accord, Arcweld
Mfg. Co. v. Burney, 12 Wash. 2d 212, 121 P.2d 350 (1942). Something more than
a valuable consideration is essential, for a bare power may be upon such considera-
tion. Paying for a newspaper route does not make the appointment irrevocable.
Staroske v. Pulitzer Publ. Co., 235 Mo. 67, 138 S.W. 36 (1911).
18. 8 Wheat. 173 (U.S. 1823).
19. Seavey, Termination by Death of Proprietary Powers of Attorney, 31 YALE
LJ. 283, 288 (1922).
20. Id. at 288.
21. Id. at 289 n. 26.
22. Id. at 297.
23. Ibid. A recognized legal estate has always been sufficient. Benneson v.
Savage, 131 Ill. 352, 22 N.E. 838 (1889) ; Durbrow v. Eppens, 65 N.J.L. 10, 46 AtI.
582 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
24. Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 76 Atl. 103 (1910) (voting trusts). Two
states have provisions that voting trusts shall not be made irrevocable for more than
ten years unless the rights are "coupled with an interest" in the shares. Under cer-
tain circumstances the rights are deemed to be so coupled. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-3307 (Corrick, Supp. 1945) ; OHiao CODE ANN. § 8623-34 (Throckmorton, 1940).
Note, 71 A.L.R. 1289 (1931) (voting agreements).
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the same test.2 5 An important elaboration made by some of the cases is
the requirement that the interest exist in the shares themselves, not merely
in the right to vote.26 The resemblance of this statement to the rule that
the "agent" must have an interest in the power itself, and not merely an
interest in the proceeds (a right to compensation) for the power to be
irrevocable, points to the conclusion that even if execution of a proxy be
considered a service for which compensation is contemplated, a mere
statement that the proxy is irrevocable will not be binding. As a prac-
tical matter, of course, a contract for compensation would rarely ac-
company the authority to vote, since normally it is given to one who
welcomes the opportunity to exercise it, and no "services" for the owner
are contemplated.
Testing the "Interest."--Since all courts use the formula that a power
must be "coupled with an interest" in order to be irrevocable, it is ap-
propriate to analyze the leading proxy cases in terms of the real "in-
terest" of the power-holder, who is attempting to enforce the agreement.
In the Hunt case, Marshall had used the phrase to denote a legal estate
in the property upon which the power could act. He was concerned,
however, with the narrow question of the terminability, by the death of
the power-giver, of a power which was conceded to be irrevocable.
Clearly, therefore, the requirement of a legal estate can have no applica-
tion to problems of revocability.
Brought over into the proxy cases, "interest" should mean only that
the power-holder has a genuine need for security, arising out of the same
kind of transaction as will make a power proprietary, in the traditional
sense. But here the analogy breaks down. In a principal-agent relation-
ship, where the agent advances money to the principal, and secures thereby
a proprietary power-one exercisable independently of the principal's
consent-the affairs of consenting parties only are involved. In the cor-
porate proxy cases, however, other shareholders have rights which should
be considered. The test of the "interest," then may be the presence of a
security need which can be asserted harmoniously with the profit motives
of ownership.
Financial Commitment to the Corporation.-Such a security need,
giving rise to a valid interest, is present when the proxy-holder has made
a financial commitment to the corporation, in order to increase its wel-
fare. In Mobile & Ohio Ry. v. Nicholas,2 7 for example, creditors of an
insolvent corporation, in the hands of a receiver, agreed to relinquish de-
crees of foreclosure and orders of sale, and to allow the corporation to
function anew, on condition that irrevocable proxies be given to trustees,
for the life of the debts. A shareholder's attempt to enjoin the trustees
from voting was unsuccessful.2 8  Clearly, the self-interest of the creditors
to recover their loans ran parallel to the purpose of ownership to secure
the greatest amount of revenue from the operations of the corporation.
25. CAL. CoRp. CODE § 2228 (Deering, 1948) ; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 2852-504
(Purdon, Supp. 1948).
26. In re Public Industrials Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 398, 409, sub torn. In re Chilson,
168 Atl. 82, 85 (Ch. 1933).
27. 98 Ala. 92, 12 So. 722 (1893).
28. Accord, Craig v. Bessie Furnace Co.. 19 Ohio N.P. Rep. (N.S.) 545, 27
Ohio Dec. N.P. 471 (Franklin Co. C.P. 1917); cf. Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, 10 F.2d
375 (D. Minn. 1926) (voting trust upheld under similar facts before statutory au-
thorization of the device).
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Again, in Chapman v. Bates,29 the directors made advances to the
corporation, and incurred personal obligations in expanding its facilities,
relying upon an agreement by a majority of the shareholders to give them
proxies which were to be irrevocable for two years. A single shareholder's
bill to revoke the proxies was dismissed3 0 Having contributed largely in
effort and money to increase the earning power of the corporation, the
directors might be expected to use the proxies to try to maximize profits.
Where the proxy-holder has been induced to become a substantial
shareholder by the promise of voting control, the agreement is generally
upheld. In Hey v. Dolphin,31 for example, two partners transferred jointly
owned patents to a corporation, in exchange for a majority share interest,
under an agreement between them that one partner was to exercise the
entire power to vote for ten years. An action by the proxy-giving partner
to revoke was unsuccessful. 32  Here the proxy-holder had a substan-
tial financial commitment in the corporation; it was reasonable to believe
the statement in the agreement that control was vested in him to insure
expert management of the business of the corporation.
Although every irrevocable proxy or pooling arrangement which is
enforced entails temporary suspension of potential control by a majority
of owners, courts which uphold them derogate in these cases from minority
rights only to achieve greater flexibility in corporate financing transac-
tions.
These dangers of minority control are practically non-existent in some
situations. Where the proxy-holder is, for example, a party to an execu-
tory agreement whereby he is obligated to purchase a majority of the
shares over a long period of time, his self-interest in enhancing the value
of the shares is apparent.
38
Negligible Interests.-In the search for interests to couple with proxy
powers, some courts have completely lost sight of the rational basis of ir-
revocability, which is probable parallelism of motive between proxy-holder
and ownership as a whole. First rights to purchase and options have
been asserted as sufficient interest, 4 although only in Pennsylvania has
this been made an express ground for decision.3 5 Again, the possession of
29. 61 N.J. Eq. 658, 47 At. 638 (Ct. Err. & App. 1900).
30. Cf. State ex rel. Breger v. Rauche, 219 Ind. 559, 562, 39 N.E.2d 433, 434
(1942) (right to reimbursement out of proceeds of stock to be sold not jeopardized
by cancellation of authority to vote).
31. 92 Hun 230, 36 N.Y. Supp. 627 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
32. But cf. Gilmer's Heirs v. Veatch, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 511, 121 S.W. 545 (1909)
(power of attorney to convey given by joint owner of land to another joint owner
held not "coupled with an interest").
33. The court upheld a twenty-year irrevocable proxy, given to depositaries to
whom the shares had been assigned under an agreement whereby the depositaries were
to purchase the shares over the period. Graub v. Blish, 88 Ind. App. 309, 152 N.E.
609, 153 N.E. 895 (1926) (dissent); cf. Stoelting Bros. v. Stoelting, 246 Wis. 109,
16 N.W.2d 367 (1944).
34. The following cases involved options or first rights to purchase, but it is diffi-
cult to assess their importance to the decision: Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com-
bined Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1947); Thompson v. Thompson
Carnation Co., 279 Ill. 54, 116 N.E. 648 (1917) (voting agreements) ; State ex rel.
Everett Trust & Saving Bank v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wash.2d 844, 157
P.2d 707 (1945) ; Stoelting Bros. v. Stoelting, 246 Wis. 109, 16 N.W.2d 367 (1944)
(proxies).
35. Although it was a voting trust, the court decided it was necessary to find
some interest coupled with the power given the voting trustees, and found such inter-
est in a provision of the agreement giving the trustees a first right to purchase, at
an unliquidated claim against the corporation, for past services, has been
considered sufficient interest to validate the retention of voting rights by
a promoter who had sold his shares under such an agreement.36
In a few cases, the abandonment of the policy against separating
voting power from ownership is unmistakable. Carnegie Trust Co. v.
Security Life Insurance Co.,3 7 for example, involved a tventy-five year
voting trust, with full powers in the trustees to vote the shares independ-
ently. The court made an obeisance to the concept of powers "coupled
with an interest," by finding the requisite interest in the control resulting
from the agreement.38 Apparently the control provided the interest, and
the interest provided the control.3 9
The outermost limit appears to be reached by a recent Washington
case, in which two shareholders having a majority between them agreed
that the survivor should have an irrevocable proxy to vote the deceased's
shares, to be binding upon heirs, successors and legal representatives.
40
Upholding the agreement against the executor, the court stated that the
general rule of revocability of powers was subject to exception only in the
case of powers "coupled with an interest," those given as security or neces-
sary to effectuate such security. It found, however, that the "'secu-
rity' . . . is somewhat elastic, and cases . . . disclose that, whenever
the purpose to be served by the exercise of the power is to protect or
further the interest of the proxy holder, the authority given is regarded
as part of a security or something necessary to effectuate such a secu-
rity." 41 If this language is to be taken seriously, a proxy secured for
the purpose of obtaining a permanent sinecure with the corporation is
irrevocable.4 The reductio ad absurdum makes it plain that the court
was actually treating a voting right as a separately transferable property,
subject to complete freedom of contract.
Terminability of Irrevocable Proxies.-The Washington case just
discussed exemplifies the general disregard of Marshall's distinction be-
tween terminability and revocability. Few cases have expressly con-
sidered whether an irrevocable corporate proxy is terminated by the
death of the power-giver, but in view of the conceptual grounds for the
double par and for the benefit of the remaining parties, stock of anyone who did not
want the trust to continue. Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 76 AtI. 103 (1910).
A deposit of shares with power to vote is revocable although accompanied by a
power of sale. Woodruff v. Dubuque & S.C. Ry., 30 Fed. 91 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
Even if the agent assumed obligations for which he claims reimbursement, this right
is not jeopardized by cancelling the power to vote. See State ex rel. Breger v.
Rusche, 219 Ind. 559, 562, 39 N.E.2d 433, 434 (1942).
36. Ecclestone v. Indialantic, 319 Mich. 248, 29 N.W.2d 679 (1947). Although
the theory of the court is not clear, the test used was that separation is justified
where there is "a property interest to conserve, and a definite policy in the interest
of the corporation to be carried out." Id. at 256, 29 N.W.2d at 682. The test can be
traced to a voting trust decision where the trustees had only a first right to pur-
chase the shares. Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 402, 76 Atl. 103, 104 (1910). See
text at note 35 supra.
37. 111 Va. 1, 68 S.E. 412 (1910).
38. Id. at 27, 68 S.E. at 421. Compare, however, note 26 supra and text.
39. This analysis has been approved: Burke, Voting Trusts Currently Observed,
24 MI NN. L. REv. 347, 351 (1940), and disapproved: Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their
Abuses and Regulatio, 21 TEx. L. REv. 139, 168 n. 96 (1942).
40. State ex rel. Everett Trust & Saving Bank v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22
Wash.2d 844, 157 P.2d 707 (1945).
41. Id. at 851, 157 P.2d at 710. Emphasis added.
42. Note, 159 A.L.R. 307, 310 (1945).
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distifiction, it seems safe to say that a legal estate in the shares will not
be required to prevent termination.43  An interesting New York case
concerned a voting power retained by a reversioner who had transferred
the shares to his wife as security for the payment of alimony. Upon his
death, it was held that the proxy did not terminate. 44 The security
needs of the legitimate holder of an irrevocable proxy require also that
it be non-terminable by death of the parties.
VOTING OR POOLING CONTRACTS
Except for the fact that the shareholder casts the vote himself, vot-
ing or pooling contracts have the same consequences as irrevocable prox-
ies.45 The policies governing their validity, therefore, are identical. Need
for consideration to make the contract enforceable must be interpreted in
the light of the cases defining the kinds of interests which will make proxies
irrevocable.
Since mutual promises are not a sufficient interest to render proxies
irrevocable, 46 it is difficult to perceive how they can validate voting con-
tracts. 47 Although numerous cases have been cited by authors for the
proposition that agreements by shareholders to vote for certain persons as
directors to secure the management of the corporation are enforceable un-
less fraudulent,,8 close examination suggests that it cannot be sustained
unqualifiedly. Even though a remedy at law for damages is not feasible,
49
no court has in fact given complete relief by compelling specific perform-
ance of such contracts, except where the contracting parties owned all
the shares. ° The statements that such contracts are valid and binding are
dicta thrown out in cases where the agreements were voided because they
limited the discretion of directors, 51 or in cases merely holding that the
voting provision did not render other provisions unenforceable.52 While
43. Seavey, Termintion by Death of Proprietary Powers of Attorney, 31 YALE
L.J. 283, 290 (1922).
44. If the husband died, the dividends were to be the sole source of alimony pay-
ments, and upon the death of the wife the stock was to revert to the husband's estate.
Benkard v. Leonard, 231 App. Div. 625, sub nain. In re Schirmer's Estate, 248 N.Y.
Supp. 497 (1st Dep't 1931), 41 YALE L.J. 921 (1932).
45. Contracts between shareholders for election of certain directors must be dis-
tinguished from those which seek to bind the judgment of a director in that capacity.
The latter are generally unenforceable. Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 (1876);
McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); cf. Manson v. Curtis,
223 N.Y. 313, 324, 119 N.E. 559, 561 (1918).
46. Johnson v. Spartenburg Co. Fair, 210 S.C. 56, 41 S.E.2d 599 (1947) ; cf. In re
Public Industrials Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 398, sub nwin. In re Chilson, 168 Atl. 82 '(Ch.
1933) (voting contract).
47. E.g., Roberts v. Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (agree-
ment to vote collectively for ten years, providing for arbitration, held revocable
because not coupled with an interest nor "based upon consideration deemed valuable
in law").
48. Cases are cited in 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 2064 n. 39-40
(perm. ed. 1933); Note, 71 A.L.R. 1289, 1291 (1931); Comment, 46 MICH. L. REv.
70 n. 1 (1947).
49. Laughlin v. Johnson, 230 Ill. App. 25 (1923) ; 3 COOK, CORPORATIONS § 622a
(1923) ; 15 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 738 (1948).
50. See note 58 infra and text.
51. Williams v. Frederick, 187 La. 987, 175 So. 642 (1937) ; McQuade v. Stone-
ham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934). The contracts would have made directors
mere "dummies." Ford v. Magee, 160 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Manson v. Curtis,
223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918). Other cases were disposed of on the principle
that a shareholder may not sell his vote for a private consideration. Stott v. Stott,
258 Mich. 547, 242 N.W. 747 (1932) ; Cone's Ex'rs v. Russell, 48 N.J. Eq. 208, 21
Atl. 847 (Ch. 1891) ; Luedke v. Oleen, 72 N.D. 1. 4 N.W.2d 201 (1942).
52. Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416 (1870) ; Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105, 55
N.E. 809 (1900).
these dicta render uncertain the enforceability of such contracts in many
jurisdictions, other courts have expressly refused enforcement on grounds
of public policy. 53 In the residuum of cases, where courts have accorded
the parties the full equivalent of specific performance, the separation of
voting power from ownership was warranted by a financial commitment in
the welfare of the corporation similar to that deemed necessary by most
courts for the validation of an irrevocable proxy.54  In Smith v. San
Francisco Ry., 5 for example, the parties were induced to contribute funds
sufficient to purchase majority ownership by an agreement among them-
selves that the shares would be voted for five years as the majority should
direct. When a bolting party attempted to cast his own vote in opposition
to that cast by the majority, the court granted specific performance of the
agreement,"6 recognizing the security need of those who had contributed
substantially to the corporate assets.t
Where the parties own all the stock, voting contracts are fully en-
forced. Restriction upon freedom of contract is imposed only when there
is a nonconsenting minority of owners. This constitutes judicial recogni-
tion of the minority's right to have all owners of voting stock free to ex-
press their self-interest.58 That there is no legal objection to purchasing
control by buying a majority of voting shares buttresses this conclusion.P9
A similar policy prohibits the sale of votes for a private consideration. 6"
53. Morel v. Hodge, 130 Ga. 62 ; 61 S.E. 487 (1908); Haldeman v. Haldeman,
176 Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376 (1917); Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 64 N.E.2d 439
(1946) ; Gage v. Fisher, 5 N.D. 297, 65 N.W. 809 (1895) ; Roberts v. Whitson, 188
S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
54. Venner v. Chicago City Ry., 258 Ill. 523, 101 N.E. 949 (1913); Hart v.
Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375 (1946); Trefethen v. Amazeen, 93 N.H. 110, 36
A.2d 266 (1944); Miller v. Vanderlip, 285 N.Y. 116, 33 N.E.2d 51 (1941) sremble;
White v. Snell, 35 Utah 434, 100 Pac. 927 (1909) ; Winsor v. Commonwealth Coal
Co., 63 Wash. 62, 114 Pac. 908 (1911). In one of the cases sometimes cited to uphold
contracts, the owner merely perpetuated his control after death by directing trustees
in whose names the shares were bequeathed to vote for themselves as directors. In re
Pittock's Will, 102 Ore. 159, 199 Pac. 633 (1921). Weber v. Della Mountain Mineral
Co., 14 Idaho 404, 94 Pac. 441 (1908) involved only a combination of stockholders
not bound by contract. In Thompson v. Thompson, 279 Ill. 54, 116 N.E. 648 (1917),
conflicting property interests in the shares were resolved, and the court gave the vot-
ing rights to the party adjudged sole owner of the shares.
55. 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897).
56. The court, having implied a proxy as necessary to carry out the agreement,
held it irrevocable, being "in the nature of a power coupled with an interest." Two
of the three shareholders agreed to vote their shares jointly for ten years, the decision
of an arbitrator to be binding if they could not agree. D voted contrary to the arbi-
trator's award. The court held that his votes should not be cointed, but that no
proxy could be implied. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ring-
ling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1947), 96 U. oF PA. L. REv. 121 (1947), 60 H~Av.
L. REv. 651 (1947), 46 MicH. L. REv. 70 (1947), 15 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 738 (1948).
57. After this decision it was provided that every proxy should be revocable.
CAI. CIVIL CODE § 321(b) (Deering, 1923). In Simpson v. Nelson, 77 Cal. App. 297,
246 Pac. 342 (1st Dist. 1926), this section was held to invalidate an agreement similar
to that of the principal case after revocation. Later statutory provisions recognize a
proxy coupled with an interest. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2228 (Deering, 1948).
58. Kantzler v. Benzinger, 214 Ill. 589, 73 N.E. 874 (1905) ; Hayden v. Beane,
293 Mass. 347, 199 N.E. 755 (1936); Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641
(1936); Application of Kirshner, 81 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. 1948), 47 MIcH. L.
REv. 580 (1949); In re Block's Will, 186 Misc. 945, 60 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Surr. Ct.
1946); Davis v. Argus Gas & Oil Co., 167 Misc. 377, 3 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Sup. Ct.
1938) ; Baran v. Baran, 59 Pa. D. & C. 556 (C.P. Luz. Co. 1947).
59. In Foll's Appeal, 91 Pa. 434 (1879), the court refused specific performance
of a contract to sell shares, whose avowed purpose was to give control to one who
had purchased his holdings with borrowed money. "The temptation to use it for per-
sonal ends, in such case, is very strong." Id. at 438.
60. See text at note 6 supra.
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Since mutual promises are not sufficient consideration, and votes may not
be purchased, effective divorce of the vote from stock ownership by con-
tract is difficult."'
CONTROL OF BUSINESS CORPORATIONS
Those who would abandon the policy against separating voting power
irrevocably from ownership of the shares urge that the power to vote
should be treated as a transferable property interest, rather than a right
personal to the owner for the protection of all shareholders. 62  They argue
that the basis of the old policy is the obviously untenable theory of the
contract between members for each other's individual judgment, that the
disinterest of the average investor in voting furnishes reason for permitting
him to sell his vote for profit,6 that the voting trust and the scattered
ownership of large corporations illustrate that separation has already been
achieved, and that a policy against achieving it by contract or proxy is
unrealistic. Further, it is said, the burden of regulating voting agree-
ments should be left to legislatures, and courts should restrict their ac-
tivity to invalidating voting agreements for proven fraud.64 Finally, it is
contended that enforcement of contracts between shareholders for stabil-
ized control to carry out long range policies is beneficial to all owners.65
The current worth of the old policy can be evaluated only after ex-
amining the interests of control separated from ownership.66 It is worth
repeating that the power to elect directors contains the ability to apportion
earnings among the interested groups-owners, employees, consumers, or
the control group itself-and that corporate contracts and salaried posi-
tions are patronage.67 Where a majority in ownership retains the power
to control, the self-interest of the profit group is always free to assert
itself.67a As the ownership of the control group decreases, however, it is
increasingly possible that groups other than those of ownership will re-
ceive the bulk of earnings, and the temptation to overlook the interest in
distributed profits increases.68
Assuming that self-interest will guide the policies of the control
group, free negotiability of voting rights defeats the traditional concept
that management must always be legally subject to removal periodically
61. See Comment, 46 MICH. L. REv. 70 (1947) passim (analysis of precautions
to be taken in drafting voting agreements).
62. Rohrlich, Corporate Voting: Majority Control, 7 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 218, 225
(1933) ; Comment, 47 MICH. L. REv. 547, 553 (1949). Macht v. Merchants' Mort-
gage Co., 22 Del. Ch. 74, 194 Atl. 19 (Ch. 1937) presents an opposing view.
63. Rohrlich, supra note 62, at 225.
64. Comment, 47 MIcH, L. REV. 547, 555 (1949).
65. It may be argued that the sacrifice of democratic control by shareholders has
brought more social profit than loss. TIPPETS AND LIVERMORE, BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TION AND CONTROL 111 (1941).
66. BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933)
is instructive, especially ch. V and VI, pp. 69 and 119. Compare ROHRLIcH, LAW
AND PRACTISE IN CORPORATE CONTROL (1933).
67. Hornstein, Corporate Control and Private Property Rides, 92 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1943).
67a. This statement is not strictly true of those corporations whose commanding
position in the economy subjects them to a great pressure of public opinion which con-
stitutes an important limitation upon the freedom of action of the owners and man-
agers. This discussion, however, confines itself to small corporations which do not
fall into this category.
68. Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 42 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (power and
funds of the corporation used primarily to benefit another corporation rather than
investors). For examples of indirect ways of diverting a part of earnings for the
benefit of those in control, see BERLE AND MEANS, op. cit supra note 66, at 123.
by the assertion of the self-interest of a majority of owners. When the
court permits a shareholder to vote as he pleases despite his contract, it
is protecting other nonconsenting owners primarily, not the shareholder
who has sold his vote. The effectiveness of the safeguard depends largely,
of course, upon the shareholders' knowledge of the corporate affairs, so
that the vote may be cast intelligently.
In very large corporations, control is often separated from owner-
ship without the use of a legal device, simply because of widely scattered
ownership. Management with little or no ownership becomes entrenched
through availability of (the proxy machinery, use of corporate funds, and
the prestige of incumbency. Owners are factually disenfranchised. 69  But
since 1934, the Federal Security Acts have provided that solicitation of
proxies for certain stocks shall be subject to agency regulation." Follow-
ing the legislative policy that ownership should have a legal right to exer-
cise its potential power of control, 71 the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion has required solicitors of proxies to make fuller disclosure and to
provide opportunity to register dissent from, as well as approval of, man-
agement schemes. 72  Effective separation by use of the voting trust, like-
wise, is largely a legislative creature, and therefore subject to strict regu-
lation. Usually the statute requires that the control group make itself
known,73 and subjects it to fiduciary obligations in managing the corpora-
tion.74 It is apparent, therefore, that the policy against separating control
from ownership is still asserting itself.
69. BERLE AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note 66, at 88-9. See excerpts from the legis-
lative history of the Federal Security Acts, note 71 infra.
70. Section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act, 43 STAT. 895 (1934), 15
U.S.C. §78n (1946) (principal limitation the requirement of listing on a national
exchange). The SEC also supervises the proxy regulations of § 12(e) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT. 824 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 1(e) (1946), and
§ 20 of the Investment Company Act, 54 STAT. 822 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80(a-20)
(1946) (proxies for securities of registered holding companies or their subsidiaries,
and for securities of registered investment companies).
71. "Insiders have at times solicited proxies without fairly informing the stock-
holders of the purpose for which the proxies are to be used and have used such
proxies to take from the stockholders for their own selfish advantage valuable prop-
erty rights. . . . For this reason the proposed bill gives the . . . Commission
power to control the conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a view to
preventing the recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free exercise of the
voting rights of stockholders." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 14 (1934).
"Subsection (e) of Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, § 12 covers the solici-
tation of proxies . . . so that such solicitation will not afford the basis for subtle
control adverse to the interests of investors who have a right to be kept fairly and
properly informed by representatives of their own choosing as against selfish, self-
constituted, self-perpetuating cliques." SEN. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 35
(1935).
72. S.E.C. Reg. X-14, 2 CCH FED. SECURITIS LAW SERV. (2d ed.) 1125,601-
25,611 (1947) ; S.E.C. Rules U-60 to U-65, 3 CCH FED. SECURIIES LAW SERV. (2d
ed.) 11138,701-38,751 (1941); S.E.C. Rule N-20A 1, 3 CCH FED. SECURITIES LAW
SERV. (2d ed.) 149,701 (1944) ; Bernstein and Fischer, The Regidation of the Solici-
tation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. OF CHI. L. REv.
226 (1940) ; Note, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 406 (1948).
73. See 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 2080 n. 4 (perm. ed. 1933)
for a compilation of state statutes authorizing voting trusts. The need for regulation
of such devices has been recognized. Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and
Regulation, 21 TEx. L. REv. 139 (1942).
74. Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 42 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
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CONCLUSION
Although some courts have quietly abandoned them, judicial restric-
tions on the transferability of voting rights independently of ownership are
still needed. Legislative acquiescence in such devices as nonvoting stock
and voting trusts is not a sufficient reason for the courts to let the bars
down further. Instead of representing merely archaic restraints upon
shareholders' freedom of contract, these restrictions furnish a modern
standard for the judicial enforcement of a paramount scheme of corporate
"dollar democracy." No control group is entitled to deprive the majority
of owners from securing a change in management at election time, except
in the unusual circumstances where it has made a substantial financial com-
mitment to the welfare of the corporation so as to merit a security need
of control. Otherwise the control group is entitled to no greater security
than the prestige of an efficient, competitive, and successful period of
management, plus the support of its own ownership votes. The inaugura-
tion of a policy of free transferability of voting rights is contrary to the
interests of all minority shareholders.
T.T.
The Appearance of Legislators as Private Counsel in State
Administrative Adjudications
In the continuing quest for improvement of administrative adjudica-
tion, it has been suggested that the appearance of state legislators as coun-
sel for private 1 parties creates an atmosphere likely to produce determina-
tions tainted by improper considerations.2  There are strong indications
that this charge is true and that numerous instances of undesirable results
have occurred.3 This Note will explore the relationship which legislators
1. Legislators sometimes appear as counsel for the state in adjudicatory proceed-
ings; but the danger of improper influence there does not seem to be serious or wide-
spread, especially in view of the usual laws prohibiting any one person from holding
more than one office at the same time. E.g., MONT. CoNsT. Art. V, § 7; PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 65, § 16 (Purdon, 1941) ; Saint v. Allen, 169 La. 1046, 126 So. 548 (1930)
(violation of Louisiana state constitution for legislator to act as counsel for branch
of executive department).
2. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIvE ADJUDIcATION IN THE STATE OF NEw YORx 123
(1942). In 1942 Senate Bill No. 96 was introduced in the Senate of New Jersey "to
prevent members of the Legislature from appearing before any commission, depart-
ment, body or agency of the State of New Jersey on behalf of any person or corpora-
tion inasmuch as such appearance or representation would be inconsistent with the duty
of a legislator." In 1947 House Bill No. 485 was introduced into the Michigan Legis-
lature for the same purpose. Neither bill was enacted.
3. "There has developed in this, and a few other states the practice of legislators
appearing as counsel for interested parties before certain boards and commissions. This
is a deplorable condition. I have in mind a former senator who appeared in numerous
cases representing certain clients, before the Public Service Commission. I also have
in mind certain members who in the past, have appeared in behalf of clients before
the Liquor Control Commission. Others have appeared many times before the De-
partment of Labor and Industry." Inaugural Message of Governor Kim Sigler of
Michigan, January, 1947. 1 Michigan House journal 54 (1947).
"The writer knows of certain instances where the attorney for the person appear-
ing before the agency was a member of the legislature. This had a material effect
upon the administrative agency by reason of the fact that the attorney was a member
of the legislature and at some future time might make things embarrassing for the
agency, if it should incur his displeasure by adverse rfilings." Letter to the REvimv,
from the Office of Attorney General of North Dakota, dated Feb. 12, 1949.
Similar views have been expressed in personal interviews and letters from prac-
titioners, government officials, and experts on political science.
bear to administrative agencies and, in that light, will discuss the de-
sirability of permitting the practice to continue.
Representation in administrative proceedings is carried on by mem-
bers of the legislature certainly in most states and probably in all.4 No
state statute has been discovered which tends to prohibit or discourage
such practice; and although many agencies have some freedom to promul-
gate regulations limiting practice before them to certain qualified persons,5
it is unlikely that such power includes the power to exclude legislators per
se. 6 Lawyers comprise a substantial segment of state legislatures,7 and the
legislator who represents private parties in agency proceedings is usually
a lawyer. Although exact figures are not available, it is believed that the
number of members of a given legislature who engage in administrative
practice is relatively small.8 Instances of abuse, however, are numerous.
It is regretted that out of respect for obliging sources, details of known
instances of abuse cannot be recounted, but perhaps hypothetical cases will
point up the dangers, prompting both memory and imagination.
1. During a spring flood, Cherry Bridge was damaged and, in
the interest of public safety, the Public Utility Commission lowered the
maximum load limit for vehicles using the span, thereby reducing the
toll revenue. Bridge Company was unable to get the limit raised
again, but Senator X took the case on contingent fee, and on rehear-
ing the Commission was persuaded, without new evidence, that the
original limit should be reinstated.
2. Milk distributor was operating with facilities which Milk Con-
trol Board, in a formal hearing, determined to be unsanitary. A new
4. "Members of the Arkansas General Assembly practice extensively before the
Workmen's Compensation Commission, the Public Service Commission, and the Board
of Fiscal Control, sitting as the State Claims Commission. They also have a con-
siderable practice before the Commissioner of Revenues, who is authorized by law to
conduct hearings in connection with certain tax matters and the control of alcoholic
beverages." Letter to the Rxvmw from the Office of Attorney General of Arkansas,
dated Feb. 26, 1949.
"Members of the Legislature very often appear before the various administrative
bodies in this state. . . ." Letter to the REvIEw from the Department of Justice
of Mississippi, dated Feb. 14, 1949.
"There is no law prohibiting any member of the legislature from appearing on
behalf of his clients before these agencies and members of the legislature frequently
do appear." Letter to the REviEw from the Office of Attorney General of North
Dakota, dated Feb. 12, 1949.
"There are, in fact, a number of such members [of the General Assembly of Penn-
sylvania] rather prominent in practice before such agencies." Letter to the REvIEw
from Legislative Reference Bureau of Pennsylvania, dated Feb. 16, 1949.
5. For a comparative analysis of federal agency regulations, see Cragun, Admis-
sion to Practice: Present Regulations by Federal Agencies, 34 A.B.AJ. 111 (1948).
6. Opinions expressed informally in letters to the REviEw from the offices of
attorneys general of Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and
South Dakota. The statutes, of course, in particular cases are controlling.
7. The following is a tabulation of the percentage of lawyers in the two houses
of the Pennsylvania General Assembly:
1921 1935 1939 1943 1947
House: 20% 17% 20% 18% 15%
Senate: 36% 34% 44% 42% 42%
The national average of lawyers in state legislatures (both houses) from 1931 to
1937 was 24.2%. WALmR, TE LEGIsLATI Pocass 148 (1948).
8. Based on interviews with persons familiar with the practice, and on results of
questionnaires directed to attorneys general of the various states. There is a general
lack of published reports of proceedings before most state agencies and the reports
available do not include all proceedings at all stages.
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installation being costly, Milk Dealer got Senator A to obtain a re-
hearing at which the Board concluded that the milk was not being con-
taminated after all.
THE SOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Since 1864 a federal statute has provided that members of Congress
and other officers of the federal government may not receive compensation
for services rendered as counsel in relation to any matter in which the
United States is interested.9 Although the statute fails to prohibit the
practice altogether, the effect is substantially the same since remunera-
tion is denied. Its broad coverage was interpreted to include practice by
Congressmen before administrative agencies in 1906, when a Senator was
sentenced to fine and imprisonment for taking compensation as counsel
in a mail fraud order proceeding before the Postmaster General. 10 In
upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the court said:
"The proper discharge of those [Senatorial] duties does not re-
quire a Senator to appear before an executive department in order
to enforce his particular views, or the views of others, in respect to
matters committed to that department for determination. He may
often do so without impropriety, and, so far as existing law is con-
cerned, may do so whenever he chooses, provided he neither agrees
to receive nor received compensation for such service. Congress, when
passing the statute, knew, as, indeed, everybody may know, that
executive officers are apt, and not unnaturally, to attach great, some-
times, perhaps, undue, weight to the wishes of Senators and Repre-
sentatives. Evidently, the statute has for its main object to secure the
integrity of executive action against undue influence upon the mem-
bers of that branch of the government, whose favor may have much
to do with the appointment to, or retention in, public position of those
whose official action it is sought to control or direct. The evils at-
tending such a situation are apparent and are increased when those
seeking to influence executive officers are spurred to action by hopes
of a pecuniary reward." 1
The federal statute's comprehensive coverage tends to prevent Con-
gressmen and members of the executive branch from espousing particular
interests before adjudicatory bodies, but influencing which goes on behind
the scenes is an unremedied facet of the problem which may stem from the
legislature's dominance over agency personnel.
12
THE FEDERAL SOLUTION FOR THE STATE PROBLEM
No state has taken statutory steps to reduce the practice of legislators
before administrative bodies over which they hold a position of dominance;
and although many agencies have a degree of freedom to determine who
may appear as counsel, none has attempted to restrict practice by legislators
9. 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1948).
10. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
11. Id. at 348.
12. "However, we do not recall any instance in this State that resulted in an
abuse of the functions of a commission resulting solely from the relationship men-
tioned [appearance by legislators in administrative proceeedings]." Letter from State
of Wyoming to E. W. Capen, see note 13 infra.
otherwise qualified.13 It has been suggested that these evils might be
overcome by legislation patterned on the federal statute.' 4 So drastic a
remedy ought to be accepted only if critical analysis fails to disclose a more
desirable one. Such a proposal also fails to recognize the fundamental
differences between federal and state circumstances.
Members of state legislatures are not expected to devote their full
time to legislative duties during their tenure of office. Legislatures are
out of session most of the time,15 and salaries and allowances in most states
are scaled accordingly. 16 Highly competent persons cannot be expected
to forego the fruits of their professions for the modest salary of a state
legislator. Lawyers, accountants, engineers, and other highly trained
specialists are necessary to compose a legislative body fit to handle the
problems facing state governments, but such men command greater re-
muneration for their services from private sources than they can expect to
get from governmental positions. Under existing conditions, these men
must be allowed to keep their private practices or the legislatures will
convene without them. Even if legislators' salaries could be greatly in-
creased, the uncertainty of reelection would deter many persons from
giving up lucrative private activities.
17
It may be argued that one need not give up all his practice, but merely
that which requires him to appear before agencies of his own state. In
the case of many professional men such an argument is unrealistic. Gov-
ernmental activity is too broad for the average lawyer to avoid contact
with state agencies in the course of representing his clients. Workmen's
compensation claims, rate regulations by public utility commissions, many
types of licensing requirements, and revenue collections represent some of
the usual forms of state administrative activity which give rise to much
legal work. It is a harsh requirement which would have a lawyer tell his
clients that he can handle some of their problems but not those involving
state administration. A client wants counsel who can represent him in
all matters. He is not satisfied with an accountant who can prepare his
tax return, but will be unable to appear before a revenue board should
it be contested. He wants a lawyer who can not only carry through a land
transaction, but can also appear before a board of revision to seek a reduc-
tion in assessed value.
The member of Congress, on the other hand, receives a considerably
higher salary ' 8 and an immeasurably greater degree of eminence. Al-
13. See a survey by E. W. Caipen showing "state attitudes towards permitting
the practice of members of their respective legislatures before boards and commis-
sions whose personnel is appointed by them or confirmed by them after nomination
by the governor." South Carolina Industries, Inc., Political Integrity Series Report,
September 1948.
In Maine, a member of the Legislature is not allowed to appear as attorney or
agent before legislative committees. Letter to the REVIEW, from Department of the
Attorney General, dated Feb. 23, 1949.
14. See note 1 supra. Compare, however, the common statutes which prohibit
judges from practicing law, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, § 1607 (Purdon, 1930).
15. The term is generally 60 days each biennium with possibility of special ses-
sions.
16. Salaries range from $5,000 per year in New York to $5 per day of session in
Rhode Island. For a complete tabulation, see Salaries and Compensation of State
Legislators, 22 STATE GOVERNMENT 50 (1949).
17. For a tabulation of the average number of terms spent in state legislatures
by individual legislators, see Walker, op. cit. supra note 7, at 148; GRawEs, AMERiCAN
STATE GOVERNMENT 238 (3d ed. 1946).
18. Congressmen receive, in addition to an annual salary of $12,000, a tax exempt
sum of $2,500 for expenses and 20 per mile for travel to and from regular sessions.
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though he too is subject to the changing tide of political fortunes, the
prominence attached to Congressional service is an asset that continues
after his term is over and is of substantial value in re-establishing private
practice.
One suggested alternative is to increase the emoluments of state legis-
lative service to the point where competent men might be induced to give
up private practice. Aside from the fact that it is unreasonable to raise
all legislative pay to the point needed to attract men of the highest income
capacity, the resulting increase in expense is not an efficient investment un-
less we are prepared to insist that membership in a state legislature be a
full time job. 19 Furthermore, even where the practice exists, unwhole-
some results are not inevitable. Not all legislators and agency members are
susceptible to unethical pressure, and it is neither desirable nor neces-
sary to penalize those legislators who maintain proper relationships with
administrative bodies.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Administrative agencies perform functions of legislature, executive,
and judiciary in particular fields. Whether constituted within the execu-
tive department, or as independent commissions, they must be subject to
control in varying degrees by the three branches of the government. As
arms of the legislature engaged in the filling in of details under general
statutes, as well as in the making of ad hoc rulings consistent with the
pattern of formulated policy, agencies must be responsive to the legislature.
To the extent that the rights of individuals are affected in the application
of policy, the courts have jurisdiction to review procedural and constitu-
tional questions.20 The executive branch, too, has a great interest in the
operation of the agencies because, in the broader aspect, the administra-
tion of policy is its function.
The problem at hand arises out of those elements of control retained
by the legislature. Appropriations must come from it with or without the
approval of the executive; 2 internal organization and procedure is estab-
lished and regulated to a considerable extent by it; the appointment of key
members of the agency is subject to its approval.22  In addition, the legis-
lature has the powers of impeachment 23 and investigation.24  Many states
19. For well considered opinion to this effect, see WAI -Ka, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 170.
20. Even where statutes have not provided for judicial review of agency deter-
minations, courts have assumed that function. See Brown, The Use of Extraordinary
Legal and Equitable Remedies to Review Executive and Administrative Action in
Massachusetts, 21 B.U.L. REv. 632 (1941), 22 id. 55 (1942). But such review is
limited by the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted. See Notes, 14
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 377 (1945) and 44 MiciE. L. REv. 1035 (1946).
21. E.g., "No money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appropriation
made by law. . . ." PA. CoNsT. AR. III, § 16. "The Governor shall have power
to disapprove any item or items of any bill, making appropriations of money, . .
and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or items of
appropriation disapproved shall be void, unless repassed. . . ." PA. CoNsT. ART.
IV, § 16.
22. E.g., "The Governor shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent
of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate, appoint: . . . (b) Except as in this
act otherwise provided, the members of all departmental administrative bodies, boards
and commissions. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71, § 67 (Purdon, 1942).
23. E.g., "The Governor and all other civil officers shall be liable to impeach-
ment. . . ." PA. CONST. ART. VI, § 3.
24. See Legislative Investigations, 9 INT'L Jtnuo. Ass'N BULL. 73 (1941). Colo-
rado has a legislative committee empowered to investigate "any department or
agency of the state government or any state institution, and . . . any of the officers
and employees thereof." CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 74, §§ 30-36 (Supp. 1947).
also have legislative councils which maintain liaison between administrative
agencies and the legislature with respect to matters of budget, personnel,
operation, and organization.25
Improper influence on administrative decisions is likely to be effective
when the sympathy of a particular legislator or group of legislators com-
prising a controlling committee is necessary to secure enactments of agency-
desired legislation or to kill proposals adverse to the interests of the agency.
The power of investigation is particularly susceptible of abuse. Short of an
actual investigation, its mere recommendation not only brings an agency
into public distrust, but paralyzes activity in anticipation. So long as ap-
pointments are primarily political and require the consent of any part of
the legislature, an additional pressure-point exists where the agency mem-
ber's term is for years and he is eligible to succeed himself, as is generally
the case. Nor is it advisable to make administrators ineligible for re-
appointment: there is need to retain experienced men in office, since expert-
ness is the very reason for having specialized agencies to administer de-
tailed programs. Because appointments normally need ratification only
by them, and because of their greater individual importance, members of
the upper house or Senate have more power to exert influence.
A certain degree of legislative control over agencies is necessary, but
reduction of undesirable practices can be achieved in two ways: (1) by
decreasing the nature and degree of control to the minimum required for
legitimate purposes, and (2) by reducing the opportunities for individual
abuse of whatever controls need be retained. Improvement in the organiza-
tional relationships between governmental departments would reduce op-
portunity for abuse. Opportunity to exert undue influence, however, does
not exist in all agencies, and because of peculiar characteristics, individual
agencies which do require remedies should be treated individually. 26  The
ultimate solution, to have legislators and agency members of high moral
integrity, is a problem for the electorate. For these reasons, no proposal
of broad solutions will be made. To aid in focusing upon the problems of
particular situations, however, it is useful to consider those factors which
are pertinent to agency proceedings in general.
There seems to be no great danger in appearances in quasi-legislative
hearings,2 7 where the agency operates as an arm of the legislature, and,
ordinarily, varied representation and publicity exist. For example, pro-
ceedings before a public utility commission on a rate increase or decrease
get wide publicity and many groups have the right to be heard. Judicial
review, also, gives the courts opportunity to correct flagrant abuses arising
in formal proceedings: administrative findings must be supported by evi-
dence; 28 hearing officers must be free from bias and prejudice; 29 there
25. Such councils are sometimes staffed by legislators whose practice before ad-
ministrative agencies would seem to be particularly undesirable. Thirteen states
have legislative councils. See Perkins, State Legislative Reorganizationr, 40 Am. POL.
Scr. REv. 510 (1946).
26. Agency organization is as varied as the needs giving rise to the agencies, and
for this same reason uniformity of agency procedure and organization is not feasible.
See BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 24 et seq.
27. The dichotomy between "quasi-legislative" or "rule-making" and "adjudica-
tory" or "quasi-judicial" is observed in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.
60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 37 (1947), 61
STAT. 201 (1947), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. 1948).
28. E.g., Northern Pacific Ry. v. Department of Public Works, 268 U.S. 39
(1925) (even without statutory requirement).
29. E.g., Clark v. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 54 R.I. 126, 170 Atl. 79 (1934)
(hearing officer disqualified because of personal interest). But cf. Georgia Continen-
tal Telephone Co. v. Georgia Public Sere. Comm'n, 8 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ga. 1934)
1950] NOTES
418 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98
must be an opportunity to be heard,
30 and to cross-examine witnesses.
8'
In those cases, however, which never get to the courts, opportunity for
abuse is greater. As an example, ex parte proceedings before a tax board
will not get to the appeal stage in the event of connivance between the tax-
payer's attorney and the board. On the other hand, in a hotly contested
case before a workmen's compensation commission where both employer
and employee are represented in a formal hearing, the prospect of judicial
review and publicity will hamper the effectiveness of improper influence.
Absent publicity, adverse parties, and the possibility of review, high
standards of ethics should be fortified by reducing opportunities for abuse.
Legislators who are members of legislative committees having to do with
particular agencies should be precluded from practice before those agencies,
and participation by adverse parties in ex parte proceedings should be
encouraged. In licensing proceedings, for example, notice and oppor-
tunity to participate should be given to civic groups and competitors. In
determining who is an "interested" party, the courts should recognize that
such representation reduces opportunity for abuse.
Some means must be maintained to prevent legislative policy from
being frustrated by unsympathetic independent administrative bodies. For-
tunately, the degree of control which the legislature needs over adjudica-
tory functions is less than that required over quasi-legislative proceedings
where opportunities for abuse are inherently fewer.32 Agencies which are
expected to reflect the dominant political philosophy require a more im-
mediate responsibility to the legislature; those agencies which make few or
no policy decisions can be isolated more safely. The chief reasons for
giving adjudicative powers to an agency rather than to the courts do not
suggest a need for close legislative control.3 3 Determinations of fact should
be free from policy considerations, although policy may be regarded as a
basis for indulging in presumptions and allocating the burden of proof. Of
course, when the facts have been ascertained, policy is a proper influence in
applying rules. A separation of functions, therefore, within certain agen-
cies, would be profitable in order to relieve adjudicatory officers from
unnecessary subordination to the legislature. Other reasons, too, dictate
the desirability of separating quasi-judicial from quasi-legislative func-
tions.3 4 To grant hearing officers the status of judges with respect to
security and political independence, in addition, is not inconsistent with
effective administration and would tend to reduce further the opportunity
for abuse in ex parte proceedings. Any reorganization, however, must
contend with such considerations as cost and size of agency.
(allegation of duress not sufficient to disqualify commissioner and render ruling in-
valid, where such duress was threat of governor to remove commissioners if they did
not reduce telephone rates).
30. E.g., Randall v. Patch. 118 Me. 303, 108 Atl. 97 (1919) (required by due
process).
31. This is required generally only in an adjudicatory hearing. Sabre v. Rutland
R.R., 86 Vt. 347, 85 Atl. 693 (1913) ; see Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control
Commission. 332 Pa. 15, 21, 1 A.2d 775, 779 (1938).
32. See note 27 supra and text following.
33. The requirements of dispatch, expertness, and uniformity of application could
not be as well met by the numerous courts, which have crowded calendars and lack
familiarity with the ramifications of technical administrative problems.
34. BENJAMIN, op. cit. spra note 2, at 44-71. The Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 60 STAT. 239, 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1946), provides for the separation of
functions to guard against bias and intra-agency influence. Protection of hearing
officers from legislative influence could be achieved without disturbing the relations
between the legislature and the policy formulators within the agency. See Davis,
Separation of Functions in Administrative Agencies, 61 HARv. L. REV. 389 (1948).
In certain agencies, legislative control might be reduced safely by
establishing fiscal independence through the assessment of costs against
parties appearing before the agency,3 5 and in such noncontroversial ad-
ministrative activities as ordinary licensing, revenue collection, and health
and sanitary inspections, agency personnel could be isolated from legislative
control by a strong civil service program.36 Finally, the bar associations
have a continuing obligation to scrutinize administrative practice for viola-
tions of legal ethics.
An approach along the lines suggested has the additional advantage
of reducing the opportunity for improper legislative influence through in-
direct channels, whereas banning the practice of legislators before adminis-
trative agencies merely forces the use of less apparent means. These op-
portunities for abuse furnish an important reason for every state to review
critically its agency organization.
I. G. McC. III.
Toward the Standardization of Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Liens
The principal property of a large segment of the American population
is the family car,' and in 1948, two-fifths of such automobiles were pur-
chased under installment sale contracts, 2 partly because of the current
popularity of the "installment plan," but probably even more because of
the relatively large investment required. Furthermore, the large size of
the investment and the ease of resale make automobiles readily acceptable
as collateral security for a loan. These two widespread practices, pur-
chase of automobiles under installment sale contracts, and their use as
collateral security, explain why the volume of security transactions in-
volving motor vehicles is enormous.3 Clear and adequate law should
govern these transactions and, in recent years, Pennsylvania has made
notable progress towards developing such laws, although it has not yet
completed the job. Pertinent provisions of the Vehicle Code 4 and the re-
cently enacted Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act 5 greatly facilitate and
protect commercial activity in this field. However, a variety of security
devices still exists, making the legal consequences of a transaction partly
dependent upon the device employed. This Note will review the evolu-
tion of Pennsylvania motor vehicle lien law, point out difficulties which
result from the non-standardization of these security devices and sug-
gest statutory amendments as possible remedies.
35. This is done to a certain extent in some agencies. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit.
66, § 1461 (Purdon, Supp. 1948) (Public Utility Commission).
36. "There has been very little abuse in Wisconsin on this score, and I think the
reason chiefly is that all of the personnel and many of the department heads of ad-
ministrative agencies are under civil service so that they are less likely to be sensitive
to legislative pressure than would be the case if our state government were operated
under the spoils system." Letter from Office of Attorney General of Wisconsin, dated
March 2, 1949.
1. Half the nation's families own at least one car. 35 FED. RESERVE BULL. 335
(1949).
2. The purchase of automobiles is the most important source of demand for con-
sumer installment credit. Ibid.
3. The amount of this credit currently outstanding is approximately $2,700,000,000.
About $2 billion of this amount originated with dealers. Ibid.
4. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 75, §§ 31-43 (Purdon, Supp. 1948).
5. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, §§ 601-637 (Purdon, Supp. 1948).
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LIENS ARISING FROM PURCHASE
The need for a method which enabled sellers safely to defer payment
for goods currently delivered existed long before the creation of statu-
tory security devices.0 Until a relatively short time ago, however, the
law of Pennsylvania held transfer of title and of possession necessarily
contemporaneous incidents of a valid sale,7 and retention of a security
title was void as against the rights of subsequent parties acquiring an in-
terest in the property for value in good faith.8 To save the situation
Pennsylvania courts countenanced the bailment lease, a device nourished
by technical property law.9 Under such a "lease," the "lessor" delivered
possession of the goods involved to the "lessee" upon the latter's promise
to pay stipulated "rent" installments,'0 and at the termination of the
lease, the lessee had the option of buying the property for a nominal con-
sideration. The lessor retained the general property interest in the
goods," . and under the law of bailments there could be neither effective
sale by the lessee nor attachment by his creditors. 12 The ban against
undisclosed liens, which prohibited chattel mortgages and conditional
sales, did not taint these transactions because the courts treated them as
being what they purported to be, merely rental agreements involving
neither sale nor lien. 13 Clearly the courts were aware of the actual in-
tention of the parties, but the commercial pressure for a valid title-retain-
ing installment sales contract was irresistible.
During the first quarter of this century, the bailment lease was the
only valid title-retaining security device, and wide use was made of it by
automobile dealers.' 4 In 1925, however, the legislature enacted the Penn-
sylvania Conditional Sales Act. 15 Not a complete adoption of the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act recommended by the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, the notable variation of present interest was its failure
to assimilate bailment leases to conditional sales.16 Since 1925, then,
automobile dealers and finance companies have had a choice of install-
ment sale contracts. Their continued almost exclusive use of the bail-
ment lease has not been due to tradition alone. The protection against
the claims of third parties afforded the bailment lessor is not dependent
6. "Security interest" as used in this Note means an interest in property which
secures payment or performance of a contractual obligation and is a legal interest as
opposed to an equitable interest. For historical treatment of installment sales, see
MERLE, INSTALLMENT FINANCING IN THE AUToMOBILE FIELD (unpublished thesis in
U. of Pa. Library, 1933).
7. See Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275, 278 (Pa. 1819).
8. Martin v. Mathiot, 14 S. & R. 214 (Pa. 1826).
9. Comment, U. OF PiTT. L. REv. 321 (1937).
10. It is fatal for the parties to use words of sale in a bailment lease. The very
basis of the validity of this device is the clear language indicating that a mere bail-
ment was intended. Hoeveler-Stutz v. Bodman and Royer, 92 Pa. Super. 425 (1927).
11. Leitch v. Sanford Motor Truck Co., 279 Pa. 160, 123 Atl. 658 (1924) (bail-
ment lessor prevailed over subsequent pledgee) ; see Jacquard Knitting Machine Co.
v. Vennell, 59 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1932).
12. Crist v. Kleber, 79 Pa. 290 (1875); Davis v. Bigler, 62 Pa. 242 (1869);
Hardy v. Metzgar, 2 Yeates 347 (Pa. 1798) ; Heisley v. Economy Tool Co., 33 Pa.
Super. 218 (1907).
13. Dando v. Foulds, 105 Pa. 74 (1884) ; Clark v. Jack, 7 Watts 375 (Pa. 1838);
Myers v. Harvey, 2 P. & W. 478 (Pa. 1831).
14. During the latter part of this period, 65% of the sales of passenger cars were
deferred payment sales. LARSON, FINANCING AuTomoBmE SALES 5 (unpublished thesis
in U. of Pa. Library, 1922).
15. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 361 et seq. (Purdon, 1931).
16. Compare § I of the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES Ac, .ath PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 69, §361 (Purdon, 1931).
upon a public record of the transaction, while such protection is denied
the conditional seller who omits properly to file the contract or forgets
to refile before the stated time has elapsed.17  Furthermore, the seller's
rights upon default are more favorable under the common law device,
which permits recovery of possession of the motor vehicle and retention
of all payments made by the defaulting lessee under usual circumstances.
The Conditional Sales Act, on the other hand, makes a resale compulsory
if the purchaser has paid over 50% of the contract price, the proceeds of
resale going to the purchaser after subtraction of the seller's expenses
and the balance due at the time of the default.'
8
When the inequality of bargaining power in installment sale contracts
led to practices on the part of dealers and finance companies which the
legislature considered "nefarious, unscrupulous, and improper," 19 the 1947
Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act was enacted.2 0  This statute brings the
activities of dealers and finance companies under close regulation. By its
definition of installment sale contracts,
21 and its introductory section,22
the Act purports to establish the positions of the parties in all forms of
such contracts. A license is required for all persons engaged in the busi-
ness of selling or financing automobiles under installment sale contracts.2
The Act specifies the form and content of such contracts even to the size
of the type to be used in certain portions.2 4 Other sections stipulate per-
missible finance charges, 25 prohibit the insertion of some types of accelera-
tion clauses,26 give the buyer complete freedom in choosing his insurance
broker,27 and declare the rights of the parties regarding prepayment, 28
default,29 reinstatement, 30 and repossession. 31 But in its failure in im-
portant respects to make the rights and liabilities of the parties completely
independent of the mere form of security device employed, it has not es-
tablished a standard installment contract for financing the sale of motor
vehicles.
Nothing, for instance, is said about a compulsory resale upon de-
fault. By employing the bailment lease, therefore, the dealer apparently
can still repossess the car upon default and retain all payments made, thus
receiving a windfall which bears no relation to any damages resulting from
the purchaser's default. A further shortcoming of the Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act is its failure to require a public record of all installment sale
contracts. Bailment leases, therefore, are still valid against subsequent
17. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, §§402 and 408 (Purdon, 1931).
18. Id., §§ 454 and 456.
19. Id., § 602(a).
20. Id., §§ 601-637.
21. "Installment sale contract . shall include any loan, any mortgage, any
conditional sale contract, any purchase-money chattel mortgage, any hire-purchase
agreement or any contract for the bailment or leasing of a motor vehicle under which
the hire-purchaser, the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sum sub-
stantially equivalent to or in excess of the value of the motor vehicle and any other
form of contract which has a similar purpose or effect. " PA. STAT. ANN., tit.
69, § 603(10) (Purdon, Supp. 1948).
22. Id., § 602.
23. Id., § 604.
24. Id., § 613.
25. Id., § 619.
26. Id., §615(B).
27. Id., § 617(B).
28. Id., § 622.
29. Id., §§ 621, 623-627.
30. Id., § 624.
31. Id., §623.
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parties without filing or recordation.3 2  A more commercially unsatisfac-
tory and dangerous situation cannot be imagined, for there is no sure
way in which even diligent parties can inform themselves of the existence
of security interests arising from the use of this device. If the lessee wants
to deceive such a party, he may represent that he has clear title to the
motor vehicle without jeopardizing the lessor's interest; a and only in
early rural communities was the transfer of possession likely to make the
bailment lease transaction common knowledge. A mere transfer of posses-
sion will almost certainly go unnoticed when the thing transferred is ex-
tremely mobile and one of identical thousands. If the bailment lease can-
not be banished, then,34 it should at least be put on a leash by making
its validity subject to some form of recordation to relieve innocent parties
subsequently dealing with the motor vehicle from the threat of invisible
security interests.
It may be concluded that, although the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act has done much to improve conditions, to some extent legal con-
sequences are still made to depend upon the form of security device used.
LIENS ARISING FROM LOANS: THE MOTOR VEHICLE AS COLLATERAL
SECURITY
Automobiles are a very great aid in obtaining loans. When a car
owner of average income needs cash quickly, very frequently the first
thing he offers as security is a lien upon his automobile. Many automo-
biles, indeed, probably spend their entire lives "in hock." Yet until quite
recently, it was impossible for lenders to get practicable, legally protected
liens upon motor vehicles in Pennsylvania. The common law pledge does
not meet the requisite of practicality since it entails delivery of possession
of the car to the pledgee. Few borrowers would forfeit the use of their
cars to obtain a loan; they might as well sell them. The conditional sale
contract cann6t be used because no sale is involved and chattel mortgages
were not valid in Pennsylvania until 1945. As a desperate "out," finance
companies devised the "bill of sale with bailment lease back." Here
the borrower delivers a bill of sale of his car to the lender, and thereupon
what purports to be a bailment lease is executed, under which he agrees
to make rental payments the total of which equal the amount of the loan
plus the company's charge for making it.35 Sometimes the automobile
is delivered into the possession of the finance company overnight or for a
few hours, after execution of the bill of sale and prior to the execution of
32. Grossman v. Land Title Bank & Tr. Co., 66 D. & C. 243 (Pa. C.P., Phila.
Co. 1948).
33. See Leitch v. Sanford Motor Truck Co., 279 Pa. 160, 164, 123 AtI. 658, 660
(1924) and cases cited there. Where the lessor, however, so clothes the lessee with
apparent ownership as to mislead or deceive the public, he may be estopped to deny
title in the lessee. Ibid.; Comment, 3 U. OF Pirr. L. REv. 321, 331 (1937).
34. The bailment lease furnishes additional revenue for the Commonwealth. Since
title remains in the bailor, a foreign corporation doing business in Pennsylvania and
buying bailment leases from dealers is subject to a capital stock tax upon the bailed
motor vehicles, as well as a mercantile license tax assessed on the volume of business
done, including bailment lease transactions. Commonwealth v. Globe Furnishing Co.,
324 Pa. 180, 188 AtI. 170 (1936) ; Commonwealth v. Motors Mortgage Corp., 297 Pa.
468, 147 Atl. 98 (1929).
35. Among the numerous cases involving these transactions are: Atlantic Finance
Corp. v. Kester, 156 Pa. Super. 128, 39 A.2d 740 (1944) ; Ambler National Bank v.
Maryland Credit Finance Co., 147 Pa. Super. 496, 24 A.2d 123 (1942) ; Commercial
Banking Corp. v. Active Loan Co., 135 Pa. Super. 124, 4 A.2d 616 (1938) ; Auto-
mobile Banking Corp. v. Atlas Automobile Finance Corp., 129 Pa. Super. 501, 195
Atl. 441 (1937). See also Comment, 6 U. OF PiTT. L. Rzv. 290 (1940).
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the lease; often there is no delivery at all. This ingenious device for
protecting loans by the creation of a security interest in the borrower's
motor vehicle soon encountered judicial disapproval. In 1924 the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania observed, "The complicated dealings of
those . . . loaning money on automobiles have reached a point where
the court must strip the transactions of their pretenses and look at them
as they really are, . . . the realities of the transactions will be sought by
the courts, they will look through the screen of paper titles to ascertain
what was the real situation."38 1 The court was not willing to "strip the
transactions of their pretenses" entirely by declaring bailment leases in-
valid attempts to retain a security interest; it merely looked closely enough
to say that these transactions were not bailment leases. The only effect
of the bill of sale with bailment lease back, therefore, was to create an
unexecuted or equitable pledge, which was ineffective against subsquent
parties who obtained possession of the automobile.3 7 There was no valid
security interest possible in Pennsylvania without a transfer of possession,
and a transfer enduring overnight was no transfer because obviously made
in bad faith.38 In the face of a great demand, then, the finance companies
were left with no safe way of "loaning money on automobiles."
Some protection might appear to have been available to the lender
who noted his lien upon the Certificate of Title which had been issued with
respect to the automobile involved. Such notation was permitted by a
statute in 1923,39 but no legal effect was given to it. The lender could
only hope that he would be able to show that a person claiming to have
dealt with the car subsequently in good faith had seen the Certificate
of Title, and therefore had actual notice of his interest. A later statute,
40
providing for delivery of the Certificate to the first lien holder assured pro-
tection against subsquent purchasers since there could be no valid sale of
a motor vehicle without the transfer of its Certificate of Title.
4 1
The real threat to finance companies came from attaching creditors
and subsequent pledgees, who did not need to deal with the Certificate of
Title. The legislature tried to provide lenders with some protection against
these parties. A 1933 amendment to the Vehicle Code made notation
"adequate notice to the Commonwealth, creditors and purchasers," and
declared that no lien or encumbrance should be invalidated for failure to
transfer possession. 42  We have previously noted that the bill of sale with
bailment lease back amounts only to an unexecuted or equitable pledge,
43
but it can be enforced against subsequent parties having notice of its
existence. 44 In the first judicial interpretation of the amendment, a federal
court confirmed the finance companies' belief that they no longer "walked
on air" every time they took a security interest in a motor vehicle to
36. Root v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 279 Pa. 55, 57, 129 AtI. 650 (1924).
37. Ambler National Bank v. Maryland Credit Finance Co., 147 Pa. Super. 496,
24 A.2d 123 (1942) (as between two equitable pledgees, the first to gain possession
of the vehicle acquires the superior lien).
38. Automobile Banking Corp. v. Atlas Automobile Finance Corp., 129 Pa. Super.
501, 195 Atl. 441 (1937).
39. Act of May 24, 1923, P.L. 425.
40. Act of April 27, 1925, P.L. 286.
41. Stonebraker v. Zullinger, 139 Pa. Super. 134, 11 A.2d 698 (1939) ; Comment,
8 U. OF PiTT. L. REv. 48 (1941).
42. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 75, § 38 (Purdon, Supp. 1948).
43. See note 36 supra.
44. Newman v. Globe Indemnity Co., 275 Pa. 374, 119 Atl. 488 (1923) ; Davis v.
Billings, 254 Pa. 574, 99 Atl. 163 (1916).
424 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98
safeguard a loan to its owner.45  Soon, however, the bubble burst and
they were back to their insecure footing. The amended section of the
Vehicle Code had been entitled "Transfer of ownership by operation of
law or judicial sale." In Kaufnann and Baer v. Monroe Motor Line,46
where Pennsylvania creditors of a New York firm seized two trucks on
which chattel mortgages, noted upon a Pennsylvania Certificate of Title,
had been given to another New York firm, the chattel mortgagee argued
that, under the amendment to the Vehicle Code, these creditors had notice
of its liens. The Superior Court held, however, that the amendment
applied only where the automobile was in the possession of one who had
received it by operation of law, e. g., by replevin, order in bankruptcy, or
inheritance. Since only a relatively infinitesimal number of motor vehicles
are so transferred, this interpretation made the amendment unimportant.
The Vehicle Code was amended again in 1939 and this time the same
provision was put into a section which applied to all transfers.47 There
has not yet been a decisive judicial interpretation of the 1939 amendment.
Some trial courts have refused to give it any effect; 48 others have decided
that noted liens can be asserted against subsequent parties even though
there has been no transfer of possession.49  The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit has agreed with the latter interpretation. 0
In the few cases which have come before the Superior Court, the court
has not determined the effect of the amendment beyond deciding that it
does not give the lender the right to replevy an automobile seized by a
creditor of the borrower, where there had been no default.5 '
Belatedly, in 1945, the Chattel Mortgage Act was passed.52 Finally
finance companies could feel certain of their safety in granting car loans:
the Act specifically refers to motor vehicles. 53 An important ambiguity
should be noted. Although a general section of the Act provides that all
chattel mortgages shall take effect and be valid against the rights of subse-
quent parties from the time they are filed,54 Section 5 requires that all
mortgages on motor vehicles be noted on the Certificate of Title.5 5 Lend-
ers are left with the problem of deciding whether compliance with both
45. In In re Fell. 16 F. Sup. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1936). the court held that notation
of an unexecuted pledge would give subsequent purchasers and creditors notice of its
existence and prevent them from acquiring an interest in the motor vehicle superior
to that of the equitable pledgee. But see note 46 infra.
46. 124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 Atl. 296 (1936). This case caused the overruling of
In re Fell, note 45 supra, by the Third Circuit in Taplinger v. Northwestern National
Bank, 101 F.2d 274 (3d Cir. 1938).
47. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 75, § 33 (Purdon, Supp. 1948), entitled "Contents, de-
livery, effect, and life of certificate of title." (emphasis added). Inclusion of the pro-
vision in this section, applying to all transfers, made its inclusion in § 38, which ap-
plied to transfers by operation of law, superfluous.
48. Morse v. Phillips, 44 D. & C. 289 (Pa. C.P., Erie Co. 1942) (characterizing
it as "meaningless"); Personal Finance Co. v. Cohen, 43 D. & C. 215 (Pa. C.P.,
Wash. Co. 1941) ; Hayward v. Wandrie, 21 Erie Co. L.J. 258 (Pa. C.P. 1940).
49. Ewing v. Meehan, 41 D. & C. 689 (Pa. C.P., Beaver Co. 1942) ; Pottstown
Finance Co. v. Ibach. 58 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 223 (Pa. C.P. 1942).
50. In re Berlin. 147 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1943) ; In the Matter of Beyer and Co..
Inc., in Bankruptcy, Cause No. 21, 385 (E.D. Pa., January 3, 1941) (unreported).
51. Atlantic Finance Corp. v. Kester, 156 Pa. Super. 128, 39 A.2d 740 (1944).
In Ambler National Bank v. Maryland Credit Finance Co., 147 Pa. Super. 496, 24
A.2d 496 (1942), although the 1939 amendment to the Vehicle Code was held inap-
plicable, the Superior Court intimated that perhaps under that Act liens noted on the
Certificate of Title might be valid without a transfer of possession.
52. PA. STAT. AIN., tit. 21, §§ 940.1-940.16 (Purdon, Supp. 1948).
53. Id., § 940.5.
54. Id., § 940.8.
55. Id., § 940.5.
sections is necessary to create an unassailable security interest.56 This
uncertainty calls for corrective legislation. The need for such legislation
is brought into sharper focus when the situation which obtains with regard
to conditional sale contracts is considered. If any record of bailment
leases or chattel mortgages upon a motor vehicle exists, it will appear on
the Certificate of Title. A private party, therefore, purchasing a used
automobile, or lending money on it, could reasonably fail to look else-
where, expecting that liens arising from conditional sale contracts
would likewise appear there.5 But the Pennsylvania Conditional Sales
Act protects sellers who have properly filed their contracts and does not
require notation of conditional sales of automobiles.58 The danger to the
average purchaser who may rely on the Certificate of Title for a full dis-
closure of existing security interests is evident. The objection to the
present situation, therefore, is not based merely upon statutory obscurity
as to the proper method of giving notice of existing chattel mortgages,
but also upon the more urgent ground that even reasonably careful persons
may be misled and injured by the uncorrelated provisions of the various
statutes.
SUGGESTED STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
Virtually all difficulties concerning motor vehicle liens arise from the
variety of security devices, each having its own characteristic incidents,
which may be used.59 Whether any record of the security interest is re-
quired, how such record must be made, and, to some extent, what rights
the parties have upon default, are all questions whose answers depend on
the device employed. Yet the problems underlying all security transac-
tions involving motor vehicles are the same. The Pennsylvania legisla-
ture apparently recognized this fact when it passed the Motor Vehicle
Sales Finance Act, which applied without regard to the form of the trans-
action. This statute's incompleteness has been pointed out in the pre-
ceding discussion. Changes in the Act and the Vehicle Code along the
lines of the amendments suggested here might provide the desired uni-
formity.
Notation of Security Interests.-The threat to innocent parties in-
herent in the valid unrecorded bailment lease is very serious. This crea-
tion of the common law has outlived the situation which brought it into
existence; the very courts who were responsible for its birth recognize
this.60 It exists as a dangerous anomaly in a community which has learned
to depend upon recording acts for safety. To provide diligent persons
with the means to protect themselves, there should be a record of all
security interests in motor vehicles.
56. Another problem was formerly thought to exist regarding notation of chattel
mortgages on motor vehicles. It was feared that the Secretary of Revenue might not
be authorized to issue Certificates of Title except upon a transfer of possession or
satisfaction of a previously existing lien. This would impede notation of mortgages
in loan transactions unless some fictitious transfer could be effected. However, the
Bureau of Motor Vehicles now uses Form RVT-33a, "Application for Duplicate Cer-
tificate of Title, for Recording Encumbrances After Title has been Issued," indicat-
ing that there is no longer any necessity of an assignment and reassignment of the
owner's Certificate. Letter to the REVIEW from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Harris-
burg, Pa., dated December 14, 1949.
57. Byse, Automobiles-Recording of Encumbrances-Certificate of Title, 12
Wis. L. REv. 92, 93, 94 (1938).
58. PA. STAT. ANx., tit. 69, § 401 (Purdon, 1931).
59. Leary, Our Uncorrelated Chattel Security Law, 19 PA. B.A.Q. 295 (1948).
60. Comment, 3 U. oF Prr. L. REv. 321 (1937).
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The Certificate of Title is uniquely fitted to serve as a recording
device. There is one outstanding with respect to every motor vehicle
owned in Pennsylvania,6 1 and although the courts held for years that it
was not a muniment of title,6 2 there can be no valid sale without its
transfer.63  It is easy to see, therefore, that were all security interests
noted upon the Certificate of Title, the ascertainment of the condition of
the title to any motor vehicle would be simplified. There would no longer
be any necessity for a search through voluminous records in local offices.
Furthermore, the Vehicle Code permits an uncomplicated procedure for
notation of liens. 64 For these reasons it is suggested that the Code be
amended so as to make notation the exclusive method of giving notice
of security interests in motor vehicles. Clearer and more satisfactory
legislation will result if reference is made to other statutes affected. It
is proposed, therefore, that Section 33 of the Vehicle Code be amended
as follows:
"33. CONTENTS, DELIVERY, EFFECT AND LIFE OF CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE.
(b) . . . The certificate of title, when issued by the secre-
tary showing a lien or encumbrance, shall be adequate notice to the
Commonwealth, [creditors, and purchasers] and to subsequent parties
without actual notice dealing with the motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-
trailer, or acquiring an interest therein that a lien against the motor
vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer exists, and failure to transfer possession
of the vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer shall not invalidate said lien or
encumbrance." Any lien or encumbrance shall be void and of no effect
against subsequent parties without actual notice dealing with said
vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer or acquiring an interest therein, unless
and until application has been made for a certificate of title showing
said lien or encumbrance, and application for a certificate of title
showing said lien or encumbrance upon said vehicle, trailer, or semi-
trailer shall make unnecessary and be in lieu of compliance with the
provisions of any other act, including section five of the Act of June
first, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five (Pamphlet Laws
1385)65 and section six of the Act of May twelfth, one thousand nine
hundred and twenty-five (Pamphlet Laws 603),66 which otherwise
would require filing or recordation of said lien or encumbrance.6"
61. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 75, §31(a) (Purdon, Supp. 1948).
62. Braham & Co. v. Stienard Hannon Motor Co., 94 Pa. Super. 19 (1929). This
case has been frequently cited as authority for holdings that the Certificate of Title
was merely evidence of ownership.
63. See note 41 supra.
64. See note 56 supra.
65. Section 5 of the Chattel Mortgage Act, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.5 (Pur-
don, Supp. 1948).
66. Section 6 of the Conditional Sales Act, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 403 (Pur-
don, 1931), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 403 (Purdon, Supp. 1948).
67. Italics indicate suggested amendment; bracketed material to be deleted from
present statute. Even a statute providing for central recordation of motor vehicle
liens and notation of such liens does not establish a foolproof method of handling
these liens. An owner might still be able to take advantage of innocent parties. If
he executes a chattel mortgage in favor of A and delivers his Certificate of Title to
A to record the security interest, and immediately goes to B, representing that his car
is so new or a used car so new to him that his Certificate of Title has not yet been
delivered, there is no sure way in which B can learn of A's prior interest. If he con-
tacts the central recording office, he will be told that the motor vehicle had a clear
Final Establishment of the Rights of Parties upon Default.-There
is no apparent reason why the remedies and liabilities of parties to a
security transaction involving motor vehicles should depend upon the
formal attributes of the security device used. In every such transaction,
the fundamental problem is to give effective protection to the interest
of the seller or lender, without prejudice to the rights of the car owner.
In the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, the Pennsylvania legislature has
attempted an answer, with regard to installment sales, by setting out a
number of the rights of parties to these contracts, including rights for the
duration of the contract and rights upon its termination by performance
or default. But the legislature has failed to consider all the consequences
of factual situations which may arise, and has consequently not explicitly
declared all rights. Rights still differ according to the type of installment
sale contract employed; the buyer's right of compulsory resale upon de-
fault, for example, is not mentioned in the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act, and is, therefore, secured only to conditional vendees. Because all
security transactions are intended to be regulated by the Act, the legis-
lature should consider its position on every legal consequence which pres-
ently differs according to the mere form of security device used,6s and ex-
press that position statutorily by amendments to the Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act.
Although amendment of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act may
finally stabilize the law of installment sale of motor vehicles, it will have
no effect upon loan transactions. But since the chattel mortgage, far
superior for most loans, is now available in Pennsylvania, the difficulties
incident to a multiplicity of available security devices need not arise here.6 9
THE EvER-EXISTING INTERSTATE PROBLEM
Although the proper subject of this Note is confined to motor vehicles
lien law in Pennsylvania, mention must be made of the laws in other states.
For automobiles, unlike most other widely owned chattels, are designed to
move. Their location can be changed from one part of the nation to an-
other speedily and easily; thousands cross state lines each day. There-
fore, diversity between the motor vehicle laws of the various jurisdictions
constitutes a potential booby-trap to be sprung upon any one buying, sell-
ing, or financing automobiles.70
An illustration of the difficulties which arise from the present lack
of coordination between vehicle laws is presented by the Pennsylvania de-
cisions on the effect of foreign chattel mortgages. It is almost universally
title since A's application for a Certificate of Title showing his lien would not yet
have reached the office. But since B can adequately protect himself by waiting a day
or two after a prospective borrower has come to him for a loan before ascertaining
the condition of the title, and since he should be aware that any very new car is likely
to be subject to an outstanding security interest, the first lender should be protected
by making his interest fully effective from the time of application for a Certificate of
Title showing his lien or encumbrance.
68. E.g., the criminal sanctions imposed upon an installment buyer for conversion
of the goods without permission of the seller. For a full discussion of these penalties,
see Note, Criminal Sanctions Protecting the Credit Seller, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 230,
239 (1949).
69. Should lenders fail to use the chattel mortgage exclusively, a statute similar
to the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act may become necessary to clarify the situation.
The bill of sale with bailment lease back, where it can be asserted against subsequent
parties, gives the lender the rights of a pledgee, not those of a bailment lessor.
70. See Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 455 (1948) for a full discussion of the problems which can arise here.
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held that a chattel mortgage validly created will be recognized as against
third parties by the courts of any other state to which the chattel is re-
moved without the consent of the mortgagee. 71 For many years, how-
ever, Pennsylvania refused to follow this rule on the ground that "it had
been the settled public policy of the law of this Commonwealth as mani-
fested by legislative acts and judicial decisions, to frown upon the mort-
gaging of chattels in Pennsylvania." 72 The enactment of the Chattel
Mortgage Act in 1945, validating chattel mortgages in Pennsylvania, might
have changed this, 7
3 but in First National Bank of Jamestown v. Sheldon,
74
the Superior Court held that the time-honored Pennsylvania rule still ap-
plies to foreign chattel mortgages on automobiles, since Section five of the
Act requires notation on a Pennsylvania Certificate of Title as a condi-
tion precedent to the validity of motor vehicle mortgages. Thus it would
appear that a chattel mortgagee is unprotected if the automobile subject
to his security interest is brought into Pennsylvania without his consent
and sold to an innocent purchaser.
Apparently the only comprehensive remedy to the muddle produced
by the existence of different lien laws in the forty-nine jurisdictions is a
Uniform Motor Vehicle Lien Act. Such a statute would give purchasers
and financers an opportunity to protect themselves regardless of state
lines. Originally the proposed Uniform Commercial Code contained a
Part on vehicle liens for this purpose, 5 but it has been omitted from a later
draft.76 Pennsylvania has so substantially modernized its motor vehicle
lien law in recent years, that one may now hope for its acceptance of a Uni-
form Act.
J.F.E.G.
71. 2 BEALE, CONFLICr OF LAWS §§ 268.1. 275.1 (1935); Lee, Conflict of Laws
Relating to Installment Sales, 41 MICH. L. REv. 445, 448, 452 (1942).
72. First National Bank of Jamestown v. Sheldon, 161 Pa. Super. 265, 268, 54
A.2d 61, 62 (1947).
73. The reason for the Pennsylvania rule seems to have been the fear that recog-
nition of the rights of foreign chattel mortgagees would have given them an advantage
over Pennsylvania lenders. See Morse v. Phillips, 44 D. & C. 146, 148 (Pa. C.P.,
Erie Co. 1942).
74. 161 Pa. Super. 265, 54 A.2d 61 (1947).
75. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE, Art. 7, Pt. 8 (May, 1949 Draft).
76. See Minutes of Meeting of July 25, 1949 of the American Law Institute.
